Abstract-A robust speech content authentication algorithm against desynchronization attacks is proposed, in order to authenticate the content of digital speech signal. Firstly, the signal is framed, and each frame is divided into two parts. The frame number of each frame, as the watermark bit, is embedded into the first and second part by quantizing Bessel-Fourier moments of the correspond signals. The content of each frame is authenticated by comparing with the watermark bits extracted from the first and second part. Experiment results shown that the authentication scheme against desynchronization attacks proposed is effective. And comparing with some existing schemes, the performance of scheme is improved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the authenticity of digital speech signal is questioned for the different types of attack. So, it's necessary to authenticate the speech signal obtained. Digital audio watermarking provides a method to authenticate the truth and integrity of digital speech signals.
For digital audio watermark, there are abundant research results, which can be divided into two types according to the purpose of application. The first type is used for protecting the audio copyright [1] - [4] . And the second is used for authentication the content of audio signal [5] , [6] .
In these two aspects, protecting the copyright and identifying the contents true or not, the great demand is to authenticate the integrity for speech signal. In [7] , authors proposed a speech watermarking scheme, which can ensure the integrity of compressed speech data. For the algorithm, watermark is generated according to the line spectrum frequency feature, and embedded in each frame by quantizing the least significant bits (LSB). The embedding methods based on LSB are very fragile to signal processing. For these schemes, the common signal processing motivated by the needs of application will be considered to be malicious attacks. In [8] , authors proposed a watermarking scheme using singular value decomposition and quantization index modulation, which is robust against desynchronization attack by using Manuscript received May 5, 2014 ; revised September 17, 2014. Corresponding author email: binhan_cn@163.com. doi:10.12720/jcm.9.9.723-728 synchronization code [9] . For the synchronization code embedded in each frame is the same, if exchanging the content of two frames, the synchronization codes extracted from the two exchanged frames will be equal. So, the attack cannot be detected. That is, for the schemes [8] , [9] using synchronization code to resist desynchronization attack are insecurity.
According to the description above, there are some shortcomings for speech content authentication algorithm currently. 1) The ability against signal processing is weak, such as the embedding method based on LSB [7] . 2) For these schemes based on synchronization code, they are insecurity.
3) The algorithm based on synchronization code can locate the watermarked signal only, but not detect the frame number attacked.
Considering the existing shortcomings of speech content authentication algorithm, a robust speech content authentication algorithm against desynchronization attacks is proposed. In the paper, the watermark bits are generated by the frame number. For different frames, the watermark bits are different. If two frames are exchanged, the different watermark bits are exchanged too. So, the attack can be detected. The watermark bits are embedded by quantizing the Bessel-Fourier moments, and the method is robust [10] , [11] . So, our scheme is more robust than that based on LSB. Experimental results show that the algorithm has the ability of tamper detection and localization. Comparison results with previous works show its superior.
The details of the scheme will be addressed in the following sections. Section II and III illustrate the detail procedure of the scheme, containing watermark generation and embedding, and watermark extraction and content authentication. The performance of the scheme and the experimental results are shown in Section IV, which demonstrate that the scheme is effective. Finally, we summarize the conclusion in Section V. S , with a given order n, using the following steps.
II. ROBUST WATERMARK GENERATION AND EMBEDDING

A. Preprocessing
Step 1: The 1D signal 1 , ij S is mapped into 2D form by using the projection as follow where nm B is the BFMs of order n with repetition m [10, 11] (3) Watermark embedding In this paper, one watermark bit is embedded into 6 successive segments, and the method is described in the following.
Step 1: Calculate the average value of 
Step 2:
Min , , E E E E  , and calculate the value U and V using
Step 3: The watermark bit , 1 ij w  is embedded by the expression ,,
Step 5: Magnify all the samples of is embedded by using the same method described above. The process of watermark generation and embedding is shown in Fig. 1 . 
Comparing WU and WV, we can get the watermark bit embedded by using the following rule
Using the same method the watermark bit embedded in The process of watermark extraction and content authentication is shown in Fig. 2 .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the following, the comprehensive performance of our scheme will be analyzed and tested. The test speech signals are selected from speech sample library, and they are all 16-bit quantified mono speech signal sampled at 44.1 kHz, wave format. The length 840000 L  , the frame number 100 N  , the intensity factor 0.18 d  , the order of BFMs 13 n  .
A. Embedding Capacity
In this paper, we define the embedding capacity is the number of watermark bits embedded in per second. [12] , one watermark bit is embedded in 9 successive segments. That is the embedding capacity of the scheme proposed in [12] is 23 w V . So, Comparing with the scheme [12] , the embedding capacity is increased in this paper.
B. Method Robust Against Malicious Tampers 1) Substitution attack
If the watermarked signal is subjected to substitution attack, the synchronization of the watermark is not disrupted. So, the location of the watermarked signal is same to that before attacking. For the segments of attacked frame, the watermark bits ( WS . So, the attack can be detected.
2) Desynchronization attack Desynchronization attack can desynchronize the location of watermark, which cause the location of samples move forward or backward. So, it's necessary for the watermarked signal subjected to desynchronization attack to resynchronize. In this paper, the method of content authentication is processed by comparing the watermark bits extracted from the first and the second part of one frame. The samples are same to that before attack, apart from the location.
In this section, take deletion attack as one example to explain the method against desynchronization attack, and for other attacks, the methods are same. For the scheme proposed, if the watermarked signal is attacked, there will be a frame, denoted by the i-th frame, from which the watermark bits extracted are satisfied Medium , ,
Then, move and authenticate the next N successive samples, until to find the N successive samples be authenticated successfully. Then extract the watermark bits from the first part of the N successive samples and convert into an integer, denoted by i . The difference between i and 1 i  is the (frame number) content be deleted. So, the scheme is robust against desynchronization attack. The method robust against desynchronization attack is shown in Fig. 3 .
The schemes robust against desynchronization attack proposed in [8] , [9] are based on synchronization code. For these schemes, they can locate the watermarked signal only, but not detect the frame number attacked. Based on the scheme proposed, the attacked frame number (e.g. delete one frame) can be obtained (the difference between i and 1 i  ). So, the scheme proposed in this paper is more effective than that proposed in [8] , [9] . 
C. Inaudibility Test
In the test, different type voice was selected, containing male, female voice. And the performance is measured by subjective difference grades (SDG) and objective difference grades (ODG) [9] . For different type voice, Table I lists the ODG and SDG values, and the SDG was acquired form 4 listeners. Form the test results we get that our scheme is inaudibility. 
D. Robustness Test
In this section, the bit error rate (BER) is used to measure the robustness of our scheme, which is defined 100% 2 R BER MP   (11) where 2 MP  is the total number of watermark bits embedded, and R is the number of watermark bits erroneously detected.
In this part, we selected one speech signal randomly, male voice, and calculate the value BER after being subjected to some signal processing operations. The results are shown in Table II , and compared with the schemes [3] . Based on the results, it can be seen that the embedding method is more robust than that [3] for some signal processing.
E. Tamper Location Test
In the following, the tamper detection for the watermarked signal subjected to different attacks is tested, containing substitution attack, deletion attack and insertion attack. Fig. 4 shows the watermarked signal. The results are shown in Fig. 5 to Fig. 7 , in which p represents the frame number of speech signal, ( ) 0 Lp represents the corresponding frame (p-th frame) is intact, and ( ) 1
Lp represents the corresponding frame is tampered. 
1) Substitution attack
Select one segment signal to substitute the watermarked signal. Assume that the samples of the watermarked signal from 50000-th to 60000-th are subjected to substitution attacked. The attacked signal is shown in Fig. 5 (a) , and the tamper location result is shown in Fig. 5 (b) . From the tamper location result, it can be seen that the content of frames between 6-th and 8-th are that attacked.
2) Deletion attack
Delete the 100000-th to 130000-th samples of the watermarked signal, which is shown in Fig. 6 (a) . For the attacked signal shown in Fig. 6 (a) , the tamper location result is shown in Fig. 6 (b) . In order to more clearly to show the frames attacked, in Fig. 6(b) , the frame number 1 to 34 are shown only, and other frames are all intact. From the tamper location result, we can get that the 12-th to the 16-th frames are that deleted, which is the frames subjected to deletion attack. 
3) Insertion attack
For insertion attack, select 30000 speech samples and insert to the 600000-th sample of the watermarked signal, which is shown in Fig. 7 (a) . For the attacked signal, the tamper location result is shown in Fig. 7 (b) . It can be seen that the content of frames between 72-th and 75-th can not through authentication.
Based on the test results shown in Fig. 5 to Fig. 7 , it can be concluded that the location attacked is uniform to the tamper location results. So, our scheme proposed in this paper has a good ability of tamper location, and is robust against desynchronization attacks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Considering the shortcomings of speech content authentication algorithm existed, a speech content authentication algorithm robust against desynchronization attacks is proposed. The signal is framed, and each frame is divided into two parts. Then watermark bits generated by the frame number are embedded into the first and the second parts by quantizing the Bessel-Fourier moments of the corresponding signal. For the exchanged frames, they can be detected by frame number converted by the watermark bits extracted. So, comparing with schemes based on synchronization code, the synchronization performance of our scheme is more effective and security. Experiment results shown that the scheme proposed has the ability of tamper location and is robust against signal procession operations, which demonstrate that the scheme is effective. 
